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Abstract  
The aim of the paper is to intervene in debates about the digital and in particular framings that 
imagine the digital in terms of epochal shifts or as redefining life. Instead, drawing on recent 
developments in digital methods, we explore the lively, productive and performative qualities 
of the digital by attending to the specificities of digital devices and how they interact, and 
sometimes compete, with older devices and their capacity to mobilise and materialise social 
and other relations. In doing so, our aim is to explore the implications of digital devices and 
data for reassembling social science methods or what we call the social science apparatuses 
that assemble digital devices and data to ‘know’ the social and other relations. Building on 
recent work at CReSC on the Social Life of Methods, we recommend a genealogical approach 
that is alive to the ways in which digital devices are simultaneously shaped by the social 
world, and can in turn become agents that shape that world. This calls for attending to the 
specificities of digital devices themselves, how they are varied and composed of diverse 
socio-technical arrangements, and are enrolled in the creation of new knowledge spaces, 
institutions and actors. Rather than exploring what large-scale changes can be revealed and 
understood through the digital, we argue for explorations of how digital devices themselves 
are materially implicated in the production and performance of contemporary sociality. To 
that end we offer nine propositions about the implications of digital data and devices and 
argue that these demand rethinking the theoretical assumptions of social science methods to 
take into account the following: transactional actors; heterogeneity; visualisation; continuous 
time; whole populations; granularity; expertise; mobile and mobilising; and non-coherence. 
Keywords 
Actor network theory, big data, digital, devices, genealogy, methodology, performativity, 
transactional data  
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In the second industrial revolution, with its automation of the streams of 
information, the analysis of discourses has yet to exhaust the forms of 
knowledge and power. Archaeologies of the present must also take into 
account data storage, transmission, and calculation in technological media 
(Kittler, 1990: 369). 
Introduction  
Digital devices and data are becoming an ever more pervasive and part of social, commercial, 
governmental and academic practices. Different digital platforms mobilise and generate ever 
growing volumes of data on social and other relations: Twitter, Facebook and MySpace 
organise and produce data on social networks; online purchasing and browsing on Amazon, 
LastFM and Google facilitate and generate data on usage and transactions; news media such 
as the BBC or The Guardian track and report data on viewing trends and the popularity of 
articles; apps on mobile phones generate records on user activities and movements; 
eGovernment sites log digital interactions between governments and citizens, businesses and 
employees and government administrative databases register the service activities and 
movements of people; and eScience and eHumanities projects use grid computing to compile 
and analyse immense data sets. There are also numerous digital devices produced by software 
developers for tracing and visualising data that is circulated on the world wide web such as 
Google’s PageRank, Technorati’s blog post aggregator, or the Lexis Nexis media aggregator 
(Beer 2009). Social worlds are thus saturated, being done and materialised by digital devices 
and what is increasingly being understood as ‘big data’ of various kinds.1 Indeed, the other 
articles in this special issue take up examples such as visualising devices in the field of 
proteomics, BBC social media experiments, new forms of online digital cultural engagement, 
and digital practices in the field of contemporary security.   
It is clear that the digital is also the focus of much scholarly analysis. A quick scan of recently 
published social science books that engage with the digital demonstrates the myriad themes 
and concerns of researchers: computer technologies and infrastructures; networked cultures; 
living and communicating in a computer age; internet and social media activism; 
interoperability and standardisation; Web 2.0, open access and online collaboration; e-social 
science; cyberwarfare; cyberspace security, privacy, surveillance and censorship; and e-
learning technologies. Many of these themes form part of what is called a growing field of 
‘digital studies’.  
But the aim of our paper is both broader and narrower than that suggested by these 
developments. It is broader because we seek to unsettle debates about how the proliferation of 
the digital is implicated in large scale social change and remaking the governance and 
organisation of contemporary sociality (for instance, Manuel Castells’ (1996) network society 
or the notion of bio-politics (Thacker, 2005; Rose, 2006)).  And it is also narrower in that we 
are concerned with the implications of digital devices and data for reassembling social science 
methods or what we call the social science apparatus. Here we build on our interest in 
elaborating the social life of methods (which is summarised in Savage’s introduction to this 
special issue) through a specific concern with digital devices as increasingly the very stuff of 
social life in many locations that are reworking, mediating, mobilising, materialising and 
intensifying social and other relations. Focusing in the spirit of Kittler (2006) on issues of 
ontology, we argue that we need to attend to how these qualities of digital devices demand 
rethinking the theoretical assumptions of our social science methods and making those 
assumptions explicit. While digitisation is a complex and indeterminate process of 
intensification whose effects are uncertain, we suggest that it has the potential to reawaken 
and rework long-established social and political relations (see also Küchler, 2008). 
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Our objective is thus to pose questions about the consequences of digital devices for social 
scientific ways of knowing. If digital devices mediate and are in considerable measure the 
stuff of social, cultural, economic, and governmental lives in contemporary northern societies, 
then what does this mean for our methods for knowing those lives? When we speak of 
methods here we mean the specific apparatuses that assemble digital devices and data to 
‘know’ the social and other relations. We are saying that digital devices and the data they 
generate are both the material of social lives and form part of many of the apparatuses for 
knowing those lives. So, for instance, devices such as Twitter materialise new forms of 
sociality and ways for people to interact and know about themselves and others.  At the same 
time Twitter gives rise to various knowledge practices or methods: academic researchers, data 
journalists and police surveillance units develop combinations – let’s call these apparatuses - 
of analytical procedures (algorithms, software), infrastructures (computers, networks) and 
personnel (analysts, IT experts) to analyse the data that it generates.2 So our questions are: 
what are the relations between the elements that make up different apparatuses and how are 
digital devices reconfiguring those relations? 
We argue that any answer to these questions demands a conceptual understanding of the 
specificities of digital devices and the data they generate. It requires the exploration of their 
qualities, which are likely to be both similar to and different from those of longer standing 
social science methods such as survey research. But before attending to those similarities and 
differences, we first want to step back to reflect on social theory accounts of how the digital is 
transformative. Our suggestion is that, despite the important issues that they raise, the 
specificities of digital devices – their materialities, productivities and mediating capacities – 
are not explored in this literature. We then turn to briefly note how such specificities are being 
addressed in the development of social science digital methods. Here we note that digital 
devices are reworking and mediating not only social and other relations, but also the very 
assumptions of social science methods and how and what we know about those relations. We 
argue that this calls not simply for reworking methods technically but also for the need to 
address their ontological assumptions.  In the second part of the paper we thus introduce the 
notion of ‘the social life of methods’. Here we emphasise the constitutive role of social 
science research methods for modern capitalist societies and suggest that this role is changing. 
But we cast such change relationally by exploring how digital devices interact with other 
kinds of devices, and how they themselves are both varied, and composed of diverse socio-
technical arrangements. Then, in the third section of the paper, we examine how we can better 
register the significance of the digital in terms of the capacities it offers for elaborating and 
mediating transactional (and especially) social relations, and we offer a set of propositions for 
rethinking the assumptions of social science methods.  
In sum, we make three major arguments. First, we suggest that the challenge of 
informationalism can be understood genealogically by tracing how the material and 
productive effects of the digital are reconfiguring knowledge spaces and the social science 
apparatus. Second we explore the limits of ‘external critique’ and the extent to which standard 
methods and conceptual tools help us to understand information from the outside. And then 
third, in an attempt to handle the challenge of informationalism ‘from within’ we develop an 
immanent critique that draws on Foucault’s dispositifs, the STS concern with inscription 
devices and Bourdieu’s field analysis.  
1: A digital age?  
There is much interest in - and much hyperbole about - the digital. But if we strip away the 
latter, the capacity of social scientists and cultural theorists to understand the significance of 
the digital challenge seems less certain. As Mackenzie (2005: 72) wrote recently: 
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Although there has been wide acknowledgement of the mobility, dynamism 
and operationality associated with information networks, understanding the 
cultural specificity of software or code objects remains difficult. 
Towards addressing the cultural specificity of digital code, Mackenzie and Vurdubakis (2011) 
recently assembled a special issue of this journal that seeks to ‘go beyond the restricted (and 
often restricting) understanding of code as the language of machines’ (4). Instead, they 
explore codes ‘not only in terms of software but also in terms of cultural, moral, ethical and 
legal codes of conduct’ and what they ‘tell us about the ways in which the ‘will to power’ and 
the ‘will to knowledge’ tend to be enacted in the contemporary world’ (4). Importantly, rather 
than a	   ‘general	   theory	   of	   code’	   the	   special	   issue	   attends	   to	   the	   specificities	   of	   code	   in	  domains	  from social networks to highway engineering.	  
But Mackenzie and Vurdubakis’s approach and contribution stand apart from how the digital 
is predominantly approached in social theory. One influential approach imparts intrinsic 
properties to the digital, which is imagined to grow and unfold so that its qualities become 
more widely disseminated. The suggestion that the digital marks a profound, epochal, rupture 
in social change is familiar. We are surrounded by claims about the distinctive characteristics 
of ‘knowing capitalism’ (Thrift, 2005), ‘the information age’ (Webster, 1995; Poster, 2001; 
Lash, 2002), and ‘the network society’ (Castells, 1996). However, re-reading many of these 
seminal texts a decade later suggests that they treat information technologies and the digital in 
a derivative way. Rather than offering novel arguments about its revolutionary capacities, 
reflections on the innovatory character of the digital tend to reflect concerns with epochal 
change originally developed in the context of other kinds of claims.3 So, for instance, in 
writing about the digital, both Castells and Lash rework familiar arguments about 
globalisation, post-modernism, and reflexivity.  
Castells’ (1996, 1997) seminal The Network Society remains a key reference. This work was 
responsible for introducing digital technologies fully into the debates about post-industrial 
social change that had been raging for two decades since Daniel Bell’s The Post-Industrial 
Society. To this extent, Castells’ intervention is the latest in a long line which is pre-occupied 
by the role of automation – for instance that represented by commentators such as Toffler 
(1980) and Bell (1976), and even the Marxist analyst of the labour process, Harry Braverman 
(1974).4 Yet at the same time Castells broke new ground by emphasising the networked 
character of digital communication. He argued that information can be divided into ‘packets’ 
and thus distributed in a non-linear and distributed fashion, an operation essential to 
contemporary capitalism (see e.g., Castells, 1996: 351-52). In this way he provided a 
distinctive twist to the familiar claims of Harvey (1989), Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) 
about the power of globalisation, the break-up of social collectivities, and the creation of new 
kinds of fluid and mobile identities. 
Yet, for all the emphasis on ‘the culture of real virtuality’, the technological underpinnings of 
Castells’ treatise are relatively under-developed. In the way he treats it, the ‘information 
technology’ paradigm has five characteristics: (i) ‘technologies act on information’; (ii) there 
is ‘pervasiveness of effects of new technology’; (iii) there is a networking logic, (iv) 
‘flexibility’ and (v), ‘convergence of specific technologies into a highly integrated system’ 
(Castells, 1996: 61-62). But there are various problems here. For instance, until the formation 
of the World Wide Web and networked computing, information technology did not obviously 
have a ‘networking logic’. Again, and more specifically, digital devices and their specific 
modes of operation do not feature in the list. Our suggestion is that Castells is claiming the 
digital to be of profound social importance, but his work is more easily understood as a 
restatement of more conventional, pre-digital themes.  
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It is perhaps Lash (2002) who has made most effort to place informationalism on a more 
elaborated conceptual basis. Following in the spirit of Castells, he sees it as an ushering in 
epochal change, and argues that talk of  
[i]nformation society is … preferable to postmodernism in that the former 
says what society’s principle is rather than saying merely what it comes after. 
…. Second, postmodernism deals largely with disorder, fragmentation, 
irrationality, whilst the notion of information accounts for both (…) order and 
disorder…. Information is preferable and more powerful as a notion because 
it operates from a unified principle (Lash, 2002: 1-2). 
This is appealing, yet in practice, this unified principle is difficult to tease out. Lash reworks 
Wittgenstein to invoke an idea of ‘technological forms of life’ (see e.g., Gane, 2004). His aim 
is to think through the immanent properties of information in order to find a basis for critique 
that is not external or transcendent to that which it criticises. Yet it is unclear how successful 
this is. Like Bauman, he tends to treat the digital as if its deficiencies are its defining features. 
For instance, it is ‘non linear’ and discontinuous: 
…technological forms of life are really stretched out. They are too long, 
stretched out too far for linearity. They are so stretched out that they tear 
asunder. Spatial link and social bond break (Lash, 2002: 20). 
How well this argument works is uncertain (see also Simondon, 1989). Thus it presupposes a 
linearity that is no longer at work. It poses the question as to how stretched out forms of life 
have to be before they break. The relational qualities of information are relatively 
underplayed (it is whatever is transmitted to others (Yoshimi, 2006)). And the argument also 
fits uncertainly with substantial empirical research that shows that the digital is profoundly 
associated with the making of what might be termed ‘local’ social relations. For instance, 
Woolgar’s (2002) ‘five rules of virtuality’, which are derived from a series of detailed case 
studies of virtual social relations, lead us away from Lash’s thesis. Thus Woolgar tells us that 
‘virtual technologies supplement rather than substitute for real activities’, ‘the more virtual the 
more real’, and ‘the more global, the more local’. Similarly, as Strathern (2000) argues, rather 
than being decontextualised, the digital actualises relations and connections that are otherwise 
beyond perception and thus inherent to the very imagining of social relations. They are 
materialisations of what Latour (1998) has called a traceable social that is being rendered 
visible. And finally, as Knox (2007) shows, the use of digital communication in large 
corporations is associated with intensive local negotiation. Rather than occupying a ‘space of 
flows’ or a virtual informationalised world, digital data is itself a materiality that is ‘alive’, 
embodied, and mobile. Our point here is that to yoke the digital to epochalist accounts of 
social change is to treat it as a reflection of familiar theoretical arguments, and tends to direct 
attention away from the materiality and productivity of digital devices. 
Finally, another set of literature relates the digital to emergent forms of bio-politics 
(Agamben, 2005; Thacker, 2005). Here, and in part drawing on Foucault, the interest is in the 
productive capacities of the digital to generate new kinds of emergent relations, and most 
particularly with new conceptions of ‘life itself’: 
The molecular knowledge of life that has taken shape since the 1960s has 
been linked to all sorts of highly sophisticated techniques of experimentation 
that have intervened upon life at this molecular level… the laboratory has 
become a kind of factory for the creation of new forms of molecular life. And 
in doing so, it has fabricated a new way of understanding life itself (Rose, 
2006: 13). 
Thacker (2005) explicitly links these new forms of life to informational politics: 
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Information in biopolitics is precisely that which can account for the material 
and embodied and, furthermore, that which can produce the material, the 
embodied, the biological, the living – “life itself”’(28). 
Thacker’s argument about how digital technology erases boundaries between the natural and 
the social is also related to claims about globalisation and so carries epochalist overtones. For 
just as theorists of post-modernism made much of the flattening of affect and the dominance 
of self-referential simulacra, now life itself is seen as complicit with informational and 
representational processes. This body of literature has also cross-fertilised with recent work 
on vitalism (e.g., Fraser et al., 2006; Barry, 2005). Here, then, the digital is seen as a way of 
reconfiguring life ‘to conceive life as not confined to living organisms, but as movement, a 
radical becoming’ (Fraser et al., 2006: 3).  
But if our interest is with digital devices, it may or may not be productive to focus on ‘life 
itself’. Here the legacy of Foucault’s concern with the production of the human subject in 
disciplinary and governing devices comes through. Yet, as several contributors to this special 
issue note, rather than privileging the life sciences it becomes important to attend to the more 
mundane uses of digital devices in information systems, marketing processes, and security 
systems, all of which offer different vantage points. Here it isn’t the redefinition of life that is 
important. Instead it is the ‘liveliness of data’ and the making of transformational agents that 
come into focus. So while these accounts are provocative and raise vital issues they do not 
place the digital, in its ubiquity, its routinisation, and its mundanity, at centre-stage. How then 
have social scientists engaged with these specificities? One way has been through the 
development of digital methods. 
1.2: Digital methods  
Several social science research centres and initiatives have taken up the challenge of digital 
data and methods such as the National Centre for e-Social Science (NCeSS (UK); now the 
Manchester e-Research Centre (MeRC)); the Digital Methods Initiative (DMI, Amsterdam); 
the Oxford e-Research Centre and Oxford Internet Institute (UK); the Bartlett Centre for 
Advanced Spatial Analysis (UK); the Centre for Research on Socio-cultural Change (UK); the 
médialab (Sciences Po), and the eHumanities Group at The Royal Netherlands Academy of 
the Arts and Social Sciences (KNAW). To a varying extent these initiatives seek to 
understand digital devices while at the same time developing conceptual framings and 
innovative methods for analysing their effects. 
In the academy, researchers have also adapted social science methods to forms of the digital 
such as virtual ethnography (Hine 2000), virtual methods (Hine 2005; 2006), and digital 
methods such as the IssueCrawler (Marres and Rogers 2005; McNally 2005). The growing 
availability of digital traces is also promoting a new form of computational social science that 
relies on the computer-aided manipulation of huge quantities of data (Lazer et al. 2009). 
Manovich’s (2009) work on ‘cultural analytics’ has shown that disciplines like cultural 
studies can be transformed by the capacity to compile and analyse unprecedented volumes of 
digital records. Text mining is also being taken up in many other areas, such as scientometrics 
(Börner 2010), computer assisted qualitative data analysis (caqdas.soc.surrey.ac.uk) and 
controversy mapping whereby text analysis enables tracking and visualising the alignments 
and oppositions in actor discourses (Venturini 2010). 
These examples could be extended, but are sufficient to make our point that a number of  
initiatives are underway to develop social science methods for compiling and analysing digital 
data. Though varied, some tend to emphasise technical issues – how can we adapt social 
science methods (e.g., virtual ethnography) or develop new digital methods (e.g., cultural 
analytics) to know social worlds in new ways. At the same time, by attending to specificities 
some are identifying and suggesting that the digital is challenging theoretical assumptions of 
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social science methods. This is because emerging methods rely upon and mobilise digital data 
and devices, which are mostly generated outside the academy in social, commercial and 
governmental sites. For others, digital methods are giving rise to a new ontology of the social 
(e.g., Latour, 2010; Rogers, 2009b). It is this direction that we find most promising and which 
we explore below. Our focus is on how digital data and devices are reconfiguring social 
science methods and the very assumptions about what we know about social and other 
relations. To think about this well we do not simply need to rework methods technically, but 
also to rethink their ontological assumptions including, for instance, their often humanist 
underpinnings.  
2: Digital devices and the social life of methods 
So we need a better analytical grasp of the challenge of the digital than is offered in social 
theory and technical accounts of method. But how? No doubt there are many possibilities, but 
our approach is to explore how the social is materialised in and saturated with devices – or 
what Featherstone (2009) calls ‘ubiquitous media’ - that are also part of the apparatuses for 
knowing social lives.  So the question is: how do those devices and data get assembled into 
specific apparatuses to ‘know’ social and other relations? We use the term ‘apparatus’ to 
suggest that methods are purposeful assemblages, just as Foucault used the notion of dispositif 
and Latour that of the inscription device. Foucault (1980) wrote that a dispositif is 
…a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus 
(194). 
For Foucault an episteme is discursive. It sets limits to what can and cannot be said in a field. 
However, a dispositif (often translated into English as ‘apparatus’) includes an array of 
material, institutional and behavioural elements. For example, in relation to sexuality, it 
consists of ‘the body, the sexual organs, pleasures, kinship relations, [and] interpersonal 
relations….’ But a similar argument works for the digital: it is composed of many different 
kinds of elements, ranging from computer networks, scanners, algorithms, software and 
applications to different actors, institutions, regulations and controversies. Devices generate 
digital data (versions of what Latour (1990) calls inscriptions) in the context of sets of social 
and technical practices and relations. And those devices and data are assembled together to 
analyse and visualise Castells’ ‘informationalisation.’ It is through such cascades of 
inscriptions – for instance from reams of data to indices – that simpler and more mobile 
digital inscriptions are often generated. And if some of those inscriptions have become more 
or less stable, difficult to undo, or immutable, then this is because of the scale of investment 
(literal and metaphorical) that has gone into making them up. It has become too ‘expensive’ to 
undo them. Latour warns us, therefore, that: 
…, the precise focus should be carefully set, because it is not the inscription 
by itself that should carry the burden of explaining the power of science; it is 
the inscription as the fine edge and the final stage of a whole process of 
mobilisation. ......So, the phenomenon we are tackling is not inscription per 
se, but the cascade of ever simplified inscriptions that allow harder facts to be 
produced at greater cost (italics in original; Latour, 1990: 15-16). 
Latour is talking about natural science, but offers a valuable provocation for our concerns 
here. The suggestion is that we need to be attentive not only to the digital in general terms, but 
to the more specific mobilisations which allow the digital to be rendered visible and hence 
effective in particular locations. In this way, we can see the extensive history of ‘failed’ 
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digital projects as entirely germane. Our first suggestion then is that social science methods 
can themselves be treated as situated cascades of dispostifs and inscriptions. For example, 
Rogers (2009a) distinguishes the ‘natively digital’ – that is, data generated by online devices 
– and the digitisation of ‘traditional’ data-gathering devices such as surveys. Each enrols 
different devices, arrangements and relations. And this leads us to our second suggestion that 
such cascades are simultaneously embedded in and shaped by the social world, and can in 
turn become agents that act in and shape that world. In a nutshell, this is one meaning of ‘the 
social life of methods’, which is elaborated in the introductory essay to this special issue. But 
if we are to understand this in the context of the digital, then we need to attend to the lives and 
specificities of devices and data themselves: where and how they happen, who and what they 
are attached to and the relations they forge, how they get assembled, where they travel, their 
multiple arrangements and mobilisations, and, of course, their instabilities, durabilities and 
how they sometimes get disaggregated too.   
This approach draws in part on STS (science and technology studies) and more specifically 
from actor network theory’s concern with the agency of objects. Thus much STS literature 
argues that scientific and technical objects are socially efficacious. Early STS work tended to 
explore natural science (Latour and Woolgar, 1986) and technologies (Callon, 1986; Law, 
2002). However, more recently, there has been increasing STS work on social science 
techniques and methods, with Callon (1998; 2007) and Mackenzie’s (2008) work on the 
performativity of economics, for example. There have been important studies of how social 
scientific censuses, mapping, and survey techniques are associated with the generation of 
powerful social entities such as the ‘national economy’ (Mitchell 2002), caste groups (Dirks, 
2001), social aggregates such as classes (Savage, 2010) and populations (Ruppert, 2009; 
Ruppert, 2011).  
The conclusion is that in relation to digital devices then, we need to get our hands dirty and 
explore their affordances: how it is that they collect, store, and transmit numerical, textual, or 
visual signals; how they work with respect to standard social science techniques such as 
sampling and comprehensiveness; and how they relate to social and political institutions. To 
tease out these specificities and qualities it is useful to consider, in an historical register, how 
digital devices compare with other, older, socio-technical devices, and consider the different 
affordances that they offer in a nuanced manner. This is an approach also taken up by ‘media 
archaeologists’ who challenge accounts of the ‘newness’ of various forms of digital media by 
examining how they often rework nineteenth century technologies (Huhtamo and Parikka, 
2011: 1).  
The available work reveals that the digital has not displaced sensuous human interaction, but 
has instead reworked sophisticated sets of devices that pre-existed it. These include the 
technologies of surveillance and control dissected by Foucault (1976) together with the arts of 
government, but also and perhaps more critically, involve a battery of social science devices 
that proliferated in the second half of the twentieth century. So, for instance, the period from 
1950-2000 saw a dramatic intensification of social research methods, notably the sample 
survey (first conducted on a large national scale in the UK in the 1930s) and interview 
methods (see Savage, 2010). These methods were championed as mechanisms to elicit 
everyday, ordinary, and mundane accounts, and were not only embodied in research agencies, 
but also in popular media and corporate customer services departments. They departed from 
previous research repertoires based on observational technologies, which depended on the 
implicit authority of the ‘knowing’ observer who was deemed able to delineate a moralised 
account of social relations. Again, as Thrift (2005) argues, new research methods became 
fully enmeshed in the circuits of ‘knowing capitalism’, in which the systematic gathering of 
information about customers, clients, employees and competitors became routine to corporate 
strategy. 
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Our suggestion is that it is the dominance of the ‘social science apparatus’ and its methods 
that is being called into question by the digital. Three features are important for our argument 
here. First, the devices that make up social science methods differ from many in the natural 
sciences by being physically unspectacular. They are not embodied in laboratories or huge 
pieces of machinery. Instead methods rely on chains of interconnected and cascading devices, 
and consist of largely statistical procedures, with relatively large corps of skilled 
‘administrators’ (interviewers, surveyors, enumerators, etc), and simple devices such as clip 
boards, sheets of paper, and more recently laptop computers to record social evidence. In 
short, they have entered the mundane circuits of social relations with no consecrated 
‘laboratories’. But this mundanity is being challenged in part by the digital. 
Second, these social science methods and their devices are deeply implicated in the formation 
of human subjects. The census and the survey both presuppose, yet also enact, the knowing, 
self-aware individual, who is able to account for him or herself. Ruppert (2007; 2011) 
analyses how censuses produce and engage subjects in identifying with classification schemes 
that principally measure biographical characteristics such as gender, income, occupation and 
ethnicity, self-elicited identifications focused on social categories. Whether individuals or 
enumerators complete census forms, subjects require particular reflexive capacities and 
agencies for the device to operate, including the ability to categorise and creatively make 
themselves legible. Similarly, Osborne and Rose (1999) describe how the production of 
‘opinioned or opinionated people’ was part-and-parcel of the creation of the technology of 
public opinion research in the early twentieth century. They argue that genealogies of devices 
can be paralleled with genealogies of persons: in the case of public opinion polls, people 
‘learned’ to have opinions, became opinioned or opinionated, which means that opinion polls 
‘made up’ people. 
In another example, Savage (2010) examines the way that the sample survey abstracts lone 
individuals from their household arrangements (which had been the traditional focus of 
community studies) and allows the very concept of the non-sexed individual to come to the 
fore. (Within earlier traditions of community research, sexed and household characteristics 
were seen as given, primordial). If this is right, then social science research devices were 
critically implicated in the formation of the self organising and accounting individual. Those 
devices, together with the recent, largely post-second world war, ‘social science apparatus’, 
which were based on the primacy of enumerating and sampling individual accounts (through 
censuses, interviews and surveys), helped champion a bio-politics of the ‘human individual’, 
detached from his or her environment. But all of this is being challenged and indeed 
undermined with the development of digital devices (Savage, 2010). 
Third, the social science apparatus was dependent on a specific infrastructure of humans and 
devices to generate appropriate ‘social data’. Without teams of interviewers, survey 
instruments, census enumerators and the like such an apparatus would not have existed. This 
kind of knowledge is not a by-product of other kinds of data generating devices and 
processes. Rather, this apparatus operates in a similar way to the skilled physician, standing 
outside the social body, and intervening in it with various devices to collect, array, analyse 
and codify samples of social tissue. These procedures are in keeping with how Rose (1991) 
defines liberal expertise, which is dependent on the knowing expert, and with Bauman’s 
(1987) invocation of the ‘intellectual as legislator’.  
But what does it mean if we argue that social science methods are becoming dependent on 
digital devices not of their making? One answer is that the digital is bound up with processes 
of re-territorialisation, and the creation of new knowledge spaces, institutions, actors, devices 
and apparatuses. But specificity is needed if we are to make this argument. We need to be 
wary of large claims. It is, for instance, likely (we’ll argue this below) that these apparatuses 
draw from, or resonate with, older technologies of surveillance. Rather than a large scale and 
external emphasis on flows and mobilities, or epochal change, we are suggesting that it is 
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important to attend to the emerging stabilisations and fixities being performed in cascades of 
(partly social science) devices in particular locations. And rather than simply exploring what 
can be revealed and understood through such devices, it becomes important to explore how 
digital devices themselves are materially implicated in the production, performance and 
knowledge of contemporary sociality. So how to think about this? 
3: The challenge of digital devices: nine propositions for reassembling of social 
science methods 
In line with what we have been saying about apparatuses, inscription devices and their 
agential capacities, we want to argue that digital devices observe and follow activities and 
‘doings’ – often, but not always or exclusively those of people. Such ‘doings’ might include 
physical movements, but have more to do with actions (transactions, choices, statements, 
interactions) and their traceability. From loyalty cards, online purchasing, blogs, mobile 
phones, websites, wikis, and social networking sites to government administrative databases, 
patents, reports and scientific and newspaper articles there are, as we have argued, 
heterogeneous and multiple cascades of devices. Included in such cascades are numerous 
applications and software for simplifying, summarising, visualising and analysing digital data.  
Within these cascades a device can make, compile and transmit digital data and/or remake, 
analyse and translate data into information and interventions.  But, this is the crucial point, all 
of these digital devices are modes of observation that trace and track doings. In the context of 
people, instead of tracking a subject that is reflexive and self-eliciting, they track the doing 
subject.5 
So how, then, do social relations emerge and how are they linked to the apparatuses of social 
science? On the one hand, we want to suggest, controversially, that we are seeing a partial 
return to an older, observational kind of knowledge economy, based on the political power of 
the visualisation and mapping of administratively derived data about whole populations. On 
the other hand, as a genealogical approach demands, we need to attend to the differential 
problems, concerns and devices through which observation is being performed by the digital 
and its material and productive effects including the reconfiguration of knowledge spaces and 
social science expertise. However, we do not attempt such detailed genealogies here. Instead, 
we offer nine propositions that arise from social science analyses of digital data and devices 
and argue that these demand rethinking the theoretical assumptions of social science methods.  
1. Transactional actors. Whereas interview-based social science methods elicit individual 
accounts and make these the centrepiece of social research, digital devices record data 
switches (exchanges), as two (or more) parties (including people and things) do business, 
exchange and interact. They are thus not derived from conscious intervention by the 
knowing researcher, but are the by-product of switches and what Roger’s (2009a) calls 
the natively digital (e.g., data generated from online purchasing). These switches can be 
multiple, complex and minute. For example, a graphic illustration of mobile phone 
transactions demonstrates the structure of communication flows between members of a 
network. It is a form of social network analysis, with no data at all on specific individuals, 
but instead a mapping of specific transactions between parties. It thus has affinities with 
the field analysis of Kurt Lewin’s sociometric social psychology, the poverty studies of 
Charles Booth, and the inter war Chicago school. Here, the focus of inquiry is not on the 
individual factors that affect behaviour, but on the spatial flows of behaviours and 
contacts: contagion, pollution, influence, etc. Similarly, data generated by digital devices 
allow non-individualist and non-humanist accounts of the social, where the play of fluid 
and dynamic transactions is the focus of attention.  
2. Heterogeneity: Building on this first point, the extent to which digital data sources relate 
to people – or indeed to populations of people – is limited. The fact that some of those 
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transactions are then pinned to people who are said to engage in doing is important, but it 
is not given in the logics of transaction. This thought can be extended in several 
directions. First, there are many transactions – consider the movement of items through 
logistics networks – that don’t directly have to do with people at all. Entities quite other 
than people make up these networks and the patterns that they reveal. Second, even if 
people are involved – as often they are – they are being disassembled into sets of specific 
transactions or interactions. It may or may not happen that they are reassembled into 
‘people’. In some sense, then, the transactional ‘doers’ may be people, but in and of itself 
this has no special significance. Indeed, to say as we just did that people ‘are being 
disassembled into transactions or interactions’ is already to risk missing the point. People 
aren’t disassembled. Rather, and perhaps exceptionally, they are sometimes assembled. 
Third, then, and more generally, it needs to be said that the move to the digital is a move 
to heterogeneity. Perhaps, following Tarde and Latour, we need to say that the social is 
about heterogeneous association rather than societies and people. It is about factors, 
impulses, risk profiles, and circuits and the post-demographic as Rogers (2009b) has 
suggested. To this extent, humanist conceptions of society are being eclipsed.  
3. Visualisation: The re-emergence of visualisation as key to social analysis is striking. This 
stands in stark contrast to the hegemonic use of numerical and textual devices within the 
social science apparatus (in this respect, the social sciences parted company from the 
natural sciences where visualisations have always enjoyed more legitimacy). In the social 
science apparatus, the marked differentiation between numbers and text takes historical 
form, since the two have not always been defined in opposition (Kittler, 2006). But in the 
move to the digital visualisation now becomes a means of showing how ‘excessive’ 
information can be reduced to a form in which it can be meaningfully, if partially, 
rendered for interpretation. In this way, as Amoore (2009b) shows, aesthetic criteria can 
be re-introduced into the use of digital data sources. Rather than statistical analyses 
(through modelling procedures), visualisation becomes a summarising inscription device 
for stabilising and representing patterns so that they can be interpreted. Although different 
in construction to (for instance) Booth’s 19th century poverty maps, they nonetheless 
share a common concern with observing patterns, circulation, flows, and boundary 
maintenance and leakage. 
4. Continuous, rather than bundled time. Both interviews and surveys can detect change 
not by comparing disparate sources, but through internal inspection of unitary data or 
linked data sets. In the qualitative interview, narratives disclose temporal sequencing 
through story devices. Surveys permit temporal analysis through comparison of age 
groups (quasi cohort analysis), or, in the case of panel studies, by tracking the same 
individual at different time points. Both thereby allow trends to be discerned through 
internal analysis, rather than through the messy amalgamation of different sources, as 
practiced by historians. These procedures involved the eclipse of landscaped and 
territorial approaches to the social, which were grounded in earlier generations of 
observational social research, due to the way that they depend on abstracting sampled 
individuals from their environment, increasingly by using the national boundary as the 
unit in which societies were deemed to operate. In these analyses, time is treated as linear, 
as a set of standardised points (e.g., years) between which comparisons can take place. 
Censuses take fixed ‘snapshots’ of populations every five or ten years and then compare 
quantities of social categories between intervals to reveal change. By contrast new data 
sources such as social network platforms and digitised government administrative data 
deploy continuous time and constitute on-going and dynamic measurements of the 
movements and transactions of populations (Ruppert, 2010). For example, eBorders 
databases focus on the identification of factors which shape ‘unknown futures’ (Amoore, 
2009b). Such a perspective offers a shifting platform on which to view change as risk 
factors are modified. However, some digital data is not routinely archived and because it 
is not focused on the individual, it has no identifying unit that can allow for comparison 
over time.6 In many cases it thus elicits flat, pliable registers of populations.  
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5. Whole populations. Social science methods depend on sampling, and hence social 
knowledge is generated on the basis of data derived from only a small selection of points, 
which are then generalised into accounts of social aggregates through statistical 
procedures. New digital data sources work on the basis of entire systems of records, so 
that the aggregate is not as important as the individual profile. Through these means, there 
is a return to a problematic of ‘whole populations’, in which it is not enough to know 
aggregate properties of the social world, but to know how everyone and every transaction 
can be scanned, monitored, and subject to analysis and intervention. Every individual who 
uses a Tesco clubcard has a unique ‘DNA’ profile which records their spending patterns, 
and those who analyse such data insist on its value in allowing a granular knowledge 
which surpasses aggregated social groups. (Instead, aggregated social groups are derived 
inductively as discussed below). This concern with whole populations also elicits a 
descriptive mode of analysis which clusters and classifies to produce social maps that are 
simultaneously moralised and normative. Good examples of these are the extensive 
geodemographic profiles widely used within marketing. It is instructive to note the 
similarities between the ‘lifestyle’ maps produced by these systems, and the maps 
generated by Booth and Rowntree a hundred years earlier. 
6. Granularity. ‘The devil lies in the detail’ of new data sources. There is a suspicion of 
aggregated properties that are derived deductively. Instead, the focus is on particularistic 
identifiers. In credit scoring, security services, social welfare or criminal targeting, and 
commercial marketing, it is particular suspect, risky, or at-risk populations that are sought 
out and identified. Databases such as Experian classify unique postcodes. In such 
processes aggregates may also be derived (as clusters of granular cases), but these are 
inductively created and not ‘imposed’ onto data sources. Similarly, government 
administrative databases record multiple cross-agency transactions that reveal detailed 
and unique identifications of individuals when they are joined up. This focus on 
granularity drives forward a concern with the microscopic, the way that amalgamations of 
databases can allow ever more granular, unique, specification.7 This is part of a desire for 
wholeness, an embrace of the total and comprehensive which is never ending but which 
generates a politics of mash ups, compilation, and data assemblage. Perhaps this helps to 
explain the attraction of Deleuzian perspectives, where the empirical is held not to be 
outside the concept, but in interaction with it.8 The subject is materialised by digital 
devices in new ways, and may be understood as a monad, a conceptualisation that Latour 
and others have advanced in relation to digital methods such as controversy mapping.9  
7. Expertise. Survey and interview methods demand intervention from the expert social 
scientist. The idea that these experts can actually intervene and generate empirical data is 
one which was largely new in the post war years, and eclipsed their older gentlemanly 
role in which they used by-product data generated by inspectors, social workers, and the 
like. The idea that experts had to intervene in the social world to gather appropriate data 
which would otherwise be absent and would limit social science was absolutely central to 
the emergence of critical social science. However, new digital sources create data as a by-
product. One does not have to conduct special questionnaire or interview research on 
Amazon customers to identify which other books customers are likely to buy. Such data is 
routinely gathered through normal transactional processes and allows customers to be 
bombarded with information about what people like themselves have bought. This is 
comparable with the way that social knowledge in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
was generated from routine administrative practices of social workers, school inspectors 
and the like. This is now the source of population knowledge to which governments are 
‘returning’. Some governments, for instance, have or are planning to replace traditional 
questionnaire based censuses with administrative records, which at one time were the 
mainstay of population knowledge (Ruppert, 2010). Data generated as a by-product of 
everyday transactions with governments (registration, taxation, benefits) are recordings of 
exchange processes and do not rely on experts to intervene to elicit knowledge of 
populations. Whether in commercial or governmental domains, different experts such as 
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computing engineers and software designers or the emerging profession of ‘data scientist’ 
are becoming more prominent mediators. 
8. Mobile and mobilising. Digital data sources, and especially Web 2.0 technologies, also 
allow various publics to be enrolled and enacted in the digital in active ways (Ruppert and 
Savage, 2012). There is a range of freely available online data, ‘apps’, software 
visualisation devices and so on. For Stiegler, these produce ‘an associated milieu in the 
sense that all members belonging to the milieu participate in it and are functions of the 
milieu’ (Venn et al. 2007: 335). We once again need to remind ourselves that rather than 
being new, this is in many regards a return to the tradition of Mass-Observation and the 
various field research activities of the middle twentieth century, all of which emphasised 
how publics could research themselves through writing and observing. This current 
persisted well into the 1960s, perhaps most notably in the Consumers Association journal 
Which, that relied on letters from the public to judge the quality of products. By contrast, 
the social science repertoires of the post war years sought to construct respondents in 
more passive forms so that their accounts could be rendered comparable and equivalent to 
each other.  Be that as it may, what is different is both the location and relation of publics 
to the numerous devices that make up the digital. Publics are now enacted and enabled to 
intervene actively by making up their own devices as well as by contributing to the 
dominance of particular devices through their mass take up. Here we need to account for 
the mobility of the digital itself, and the capacity for the circulation, sharing and take up of 
devices and data across numerous sites that increasingly transcend institutional 
boundaries.10 
9. Non-coherence: The proliferation of devices for tracking, tracing and visualising 
relations has a further consequence. It is at least in some measure distributed. In an era of 
Wikileaks it is important not to get caught up by hype. Nevertheless, it is none the less the 
case that much transactional data is widely, and in some cases generally, available for 
those with access to the internet. It is also the case that there are very large numbers of 
‘apps’ available in the public domain for mining and visualising that data. The 
consequence is that there are many distributed locations of socially relevant digitally 
derived knowledge. There are various ways of thinking about this. Some would claim that 
this represents a ‘democratisation’ of knowledge, though we would be wary of such a 
large claim. At the other end of the spectrum, others would argue that this represents the 
erosion of properly validated knowledge of and expertise about the social.11 We would be 
equally cautious before making this argument. What we would suggest, however, is that 
since both the distribution of digital devices and inscriptions is widespread, and that 
cascading devices work in different ways to produce different effects in different 
locations and circumstances, it is more readily apparent that knowledges do not cohere to 
generate a single authoritative representation of the social. In short, we want to suggest 
that social knowledge is more visibly non-coherent than it was in the recent past (though 
we would need to emphasise that this does not mean that it is necessarily incoherent, 
which is a different and normative claim).12 
Conclusion 
We have suggested the need for a heterogeneous understanding of the digital, one that does 
not seek to ascribe fixed characteristics to it, but which emphasises the contingencies by 
which it can be mobilised and deployed. But we also want to emphasise that digital devices 
and data imply a significant challenge to the social science apparatus. Where then in such 
cascades are social science methods located? What is their relative location and role within 
the productive, material and performative work of the digital? 
We suggest that an analogy with Bourdieu’s concept of field analysis will help. In this agents 
are not seen to possess intrinsic qualities and capacities in and of themselves, but only with 
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respect to other agents who are also struggling for position of advantage in a competitive 
field. Applied to digital devices, this suggests that they do not carry innate meanings in and of 
themselves, but are championed as competitors and (if we may extend the metaphor) are 
complementary to other devices. Overall, it is their comparative relationships with one 
another that define their efficacy or indispensability. Thus for Latour (1990), it is investments 
in inscriptions and their mobilisations that are the sources of dominance. Rather than 
competition between ideas, it is competition between material devices where those that 
assemble and summarise become ‘centres of calculation.’ But crucial to this is their mobility, 
transmission and circulation – and the similar movement of inscriptions. There is no room for 
epochs here. Instead we need to explore fields of devices as relational spaces where some 
devices survive and dominate in particular locations while others are eclipsed, at least for the 
moment. 
 
In thinking about this, we have tried to argue that it does not help to imagine the digital in 
terms of epochal shifts or redefinitions of life. The lively and productive changes brought by 
the digital are no doubt large, but they need to be explored carefully, with due attention to 
their specificities. And, as a part of this, we have also argued that they often turn out to 
instantiate and reconstitute older practices, forms of stabilisation, and control. There are many 
productive devices in the representational landscape – and those that are new interact and 
sometimes compete with those that are older. Rather than assuming a simple teleology in 
which the former simply displace the older, we have recommended a genealogical approach 
that is alive both to the ways in which digital devices reconfigure expertise and institutional 
circuits, and the ways that social agents of various kinds contest their value and efficacy. At 
the same time, we have argued that it is important to attend to their distinctive qualities as 
‘automated’ devices in which data are by-products that do not require the awareness or 
intervention of transacting individuals or academic experts. If we are to do this well we will 
need to vary the magnification as we explore the chains of relations and practices enrolled in 
the social science apparatus. 
                                                      
1 While variously defined, big data refers to large volumes digital content that is generated either online 
or offline in social, commercial, scientific and governmental databases. But the term does not simply 
signify an increase in the volume but also the velocity of data collection and the increasing variety of 
data sources and formats. These qualities make it difficult to analyse data using traditional data 
management and processing applications. Thus, an additional defining characteristic is the innovation 
of data structures, computational capacities, and processing tools and analytics to capture, curate, store, 
search, trace, link, share, visualise and analyse big datasets. See for example discussions in boyd and 
Crawford (2012), Manovitch (2011) and Schroeder and Meyer (2012). 
2 This was well illustrated in the 2011 ‘riots’ in England. Twitter data has been analysed by the police, 
researchers, and journalists to generate knowledge about the disturbances: for example, Manchester 
eResearch Centre’s Twitter analysis project with The Guardian examined how the news of the riots 
spread (http://bit.ly/w3IHS6) and the Metropolitan Police trawled through Twitter and other social 
networking sites to gather evidence of people inciting rioting. Christakis (2012) has made a similar 
argument in relation to the Internet: it is changing social science methods as well as its objects and 
subjects of analysis.  
3 Though we should state that Lyotard (1979) did note the role of technoscientific transformations in 
cybernetics, communication theory, data storage and transmission as elements in his account of the 
post-modern condition. 
4 See for instance the comments of Yoshimi (2006: 276): ‘it is generally assumed that information 
technology alone can fundamentally alter society. The exact nature of the technology cited as the 
explanatory variable has changed with the times. At one time it was television; later it was the main-
frame computer; then it was the computer network, and most recently, mobile media ...’, and similarly 
‘Clearly, there is nothing ‘post-’ modern about information society theory. It is no more than a faithful 
reproduction of the principles of ‘modern’ industrialism adjusted to fit the ‘new’ conditions of 
information technology.’ 
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5 In relation to social network analysis, Watts (2007) has argued that new computational analytics of 
millions of network data enables the tracing of ties and social behaviour that does not rely on self-
reports from participants which are full of ‘cognitive biases, errors of perception and framing 
ambiguities’ (489).  
6 The detailed accounts of transactions collected as part of the Tesco loyalty card system, for instance, 
are not preserved for more than two years. However, other forms of digital data such as certain archives 
and government databases have longer durations. 
7 Watts (2007), for example, has argued that Internet-based communication has now enabled the 
analysis of the ‘real-time interactions of millions of people at a resolution that is sensitive to effects at 
the level of the individual’ (489). 
8 See for instance, Rose, ‘when I talk about empiricism a la Deleuze… I mean… an attempt to set up a 
constant dynamic engagement between thought and its object, and thus a concern with engaging the 
specificities of situations, cases and elements’ (in Gane, 2004: 176). 
9 The resurgence of monadology within contemporary social science has been marked by recent work 
on Tarde. See, for instance, Candea (2010). However, as we have just implied, it is also embedded in 
Deleuze’s influential writing (see in particular Deleuze (1993)). Though it is often treated otherwise, 
actor-network theory is also a form of monadology. See Latour (1988). 
10 Though there is still much boundary-making especially in government and commercial data and 
applications. 
11 See for example the discussion in Savage and Burrows (2007).  
12 We have phrased this carefully. Knowledges have always been different. It is the visibility of that 
difference that has changed. 
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